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RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS AND 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
T
he right-to-work (RTW) law ensures that
workers are not forced to join unions or pay
union dues as a condition of employment.1
Despite many years of research, the impact of these
laws on a state’s economic performance is still a
controversial issue. Using a diverse set of data and
methods, a sizeable body of literature has concen-
trated on understanding whether the passage of
RTW laws matters.2 RTW laws continue to be an
important issue on states’ agendas and a source of
fierce campaigning by pro- and anti-union groups.
For instance, in September 2001, Oklahoma adopted
the RTW law after a lengthy period of campaigns
for and against it.
States with RTW laws usually offer additional
policies as part of a pro-business profile designed
to attract new firms and boost industrial develop-
ment. This is the view taken by Holmes (1998), who
uses the RTW law as a proxy for the state’s business-
friendly climate. He studies the effects of pro-
business policies on economic activity by examining
the performance of manufacturing industries across
state borders where one state has a RTW law and
the other does not. His analysis identifies a large,
positive impact of an overall favorable business
climate, but the effects cannot be traced to any
particular state legislation, such as a RTW law.
Many states passed RTW laws in the mid-1940s
to early 1950s. Since then, except for the 2001 adop-
tion by Oklahoma, only two other states adopted
them: Louisiana in 1976 and Idaho in 1986. Indiana
adopted the law in 1957, but repealed it in 1965. It
is natural to think that economic conditions today
are quite different from those that prevailed during
the earlier period when many states passed the law
en masse. An important question then is whether
the late adopters of this law have experienced any
real benefits.
Idaho’s Case
In this paper, we reassess the economic impact
of the RTW law by focusing on Idaho’s experience.3
Idaho adopted their RTW law in 1986, at a time
when the decline in unionization in the U.S. had
substantially run its course.4 Was the passage of
the law merely a gesture that simply reflected a
trend of decline in unionization, or did it have a
significant influence in making Idaho a more attrac-
tive location for business in the years following the
adoption? Our goal is to provide some evidence on
how Idaho’s unionization rate and industrial per-
formance evolved over time, both before and after
the passage of the RTW law, thereby contributing
to the literature on the effect of business-friendly
policies on states’ industrial performance.
One important aspect of Idaho’s experience is
that the passage of the law itself was a long and
controversial process that took nearly two years.
The critical events related to the legislation process
are summarized in Abraham and Voos (2000). The
original bill was introduced to Idaho’s House in
January 1985, and the law was eventually passed
in November 1986, after a lengthy political and
bureaucratic process involving several confronta-
tions between pro-law and anti-law groups, as well
as a veto and several delays. The law finally took
effect in 1987.
A detailed investigation of other business policies
adopted in Idaho around 1987 reveals that there
were no other major changes in Idaho’s business
1 Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947 by Congress,
reaffirms states’ rights to pass RTW laws. These laws may or may not
apply to federal workers, depending on the specifics.
2 See Moore and Newman (1985) and Moore (1998) for a comprehensive
review of this literature.
3 Louisiana is also a candidate for such a study. However, the unavailabil-
ity of long time series data before Louisiana’s adoption year (1976)
prevents the investigation of this case in detail.
4 Goldfield (1987) reports that between 1954 and 1978 the union
membership rate in the United States declined from 34.7 percent to
23.6 percent. See Goldfield (1987) for a comprehensive analysis of
the declining unionization in the United States. According to Hirsch,
Macpherson, and Vroman (2001), the union membership rate declined
from 29.3 percent in 1964 to 24.1 percent in 1977, and then to 13.6
percent in 2000.
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Idaho offers an interesting case study not only
because it is a late adopter, but also because three
of its six neighboring states have had the RTW law
for a long time and three have traditionally been
non-right-to-work (NRTW) law states.6 Figure 1
shows Idaho and its neighbors, which provide poten-
tial controls against which to judge Idaho’s perfor-
mance. Clearly, these states are imperfect controls.
However, among all other states, Idaho’s neighbors
seem to be a natural choice for comparison for
the reason, if nothing else, that we can control for
common region-specific factors that do not vary
over time. Responses to nationwide economic fluc-
tuations vary substantially across regions. Focusing
on a particular region minimizes this problem. In
analyzing the evolution of unionization rates, we also
consider the experience of states with an industry
mix that was similar to that of Idaho to account for
differences arising from the composition of indus-
trial activity.
Our empirical analysis has two main parts. First,
we look at the evolution of the unionization rate
before and after the law. We find that there was a
large decline in unionization between 1981 and
1984, the year before the bill was introduced to the
legislature. The unionization rate then rebounded
somewhat until 1987, the year the law officially
took effect, but continued to decline persistently
thereafter. Idaho’s unionization rate gradually
became very similar to the average unionization
rate of other RTW states with a similar industrial
mix. When we compare Idaho’s unionization rate
also to that of its geographic neighbors, we find
that, particularly in the manufacturing sector,
Idaho’s unionization rate exhibits a significantly
faster decline.
Second, we investigate the manufacturing
sector’s performance pre- and post-law. We observe
that in the post-law period, Idaho experienced a
significant and persistent annual growth in manu-
facturing employment and in the number of estab-
lishments, as opposed to virtually zero growth in
both of these variables in the pre-law period. The
difference between the pre-law and post-law growth
rates in Idaho was significantly larger compared
with other states in the region. In addition, we find
that the fraction of total manufacturing employment
in large manufacturing establishments increased
significantly in Idaho after the law was passed. The
average size of large manufacturing establishments
also grew substantially in the post-law period.7 Our
observations are consistent with the hypothesis
that Idaho became more attractive for large plants
because of declining unionization.
Overall, our findings indicate that the increase
in Idaho’s industrial growth rate is strongly related
to the decline in unionization. While we are tempted
to associate the patterns observed with the passage
of the law itself, the timing of the decline in the
unionization rate prevents such a definitive conclu-
sion. The large decline in unionization started about
four years prior to the almost two-year-long bureau-
cratic process that eventually led to the passage of
the law. This prompts us to consider the hypothesis
that the passage of the law might actually have
been a consequence of the decline in unionization
and growing anti-unionism in Idaho, rather than a
cause. Consequently, while the declining unioniza-
tion appears to be responsible for the strong post-law
growth trends in Idaho, we cannot fully ascribe the
initiation of the trends to the law itself. The passage
of the law, however, seems to have strengthened
and reinforced the trends.
Literature Review
One expects that a first-order effect of the
passage of a RTW law would be a reduction in the
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5 We examined, in particular, the Directory of Incentives for Business
Investment and Development in the United States, published by the
National Association of State Development Agencies.
6 The RTW neighbors, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, adopted the law in
1951, 1955, and 1963, respectively. The time period between these
years and our first observation year (1975) is long enough to give us
some comfort that the potential effects of the RTW law must have
already been realized  to a large extent in these states.
7 In general, larger establishments are more likely to be unionized and,
therefore, have more incentives to avoid unions. See Long (1993),
Galarneau (1996), and Lowe (1998) for evidence on this in Canada.








Wyomingunion membership rate. There are several reasons
why this might be the case. As Ellwood and Fine
(1987) point out, the most obvious reason is that
the passage of the law makes unions less attractive
to workers because unions no longer have the ability
to enforce payments and fines. These effects depress
new union organizing and also deter the replace-
ment of decertified unions. If a state’s labor force is
growing, then less union organizing means also a
reduction in the union membership rate.
Most earlier studies, surveyed by Moore and
Newman (1985) and Moore (1998), found a weak
relationship between the passage of RTW laws and
the level of the union membership rate. However,
this does not mean that unionization activity was
not influenced by RTW laws. Using 1951-77 data for
50 states on new union organizing activity (a mea-
sure of new membership flow into unions, rather
than the level of unionization), Ellwood and Fine
(1987) presented convincing evidence that the
passage of RTW laws led to a decline in new union
organizing of about 46 percent for the first five years
after the legislation and 30 percent during the next
five. This reduction in organizing disappears after a
decade. The level of union membership, as a result,
declines in most states by about 5 to 10 percent after
the 10 years, which may not have been detected
by the econometric methods used in the previous
studies. Further tests reveal that these findings are
robust to time-invariant differences across states.
Idaho’s experience provides a natural setting to
further assess the evolution of the union member-
ship rates before and after the passage of the law.
Since we are looking at the same state both before
and after, time-invariant state-specific factors should
be irrelevant for the pattern of evolution in the union
membership rates.
As we mentioned before, an important concern
is whether declining union strength is a catalyst
for the passage of RTW laws, as opposed to being
a result of it. If the passing of RTW laws is a conse-
quence rather than the cause, then the reduction
in union organizing should be visible during the
immediate years before the passage of the law.
Ellwood and Fine (1987) investigated this possibility
by analyzing the evolution of new union organizing
for seven states prior to the adoption of the law;
they detected no reduction in union organizing
during that period and concluded that the decline
in union organizing is likely to have been caused
by the passage of RTW laws.
According to the anecdotal evidence in Kendrick
(1996), one possible source of the events that led to
the eventual passage of the law was the “Bunker Hill”
incident. In 1984, employees of the Bunker Hill
mining company in Idaho voted for voluntary pay
cuts and other concessions to keep the company
from going out of business. The union headquarters
in Pittsburgh overruled this vote, resulting in a loss
of 1500 jobs. The Bunker Hill incident might have
initiated a change in attitude toward unions in Idaho.
If this is the case, then a growing anti-unionism in
the state might be the reason for the eventual pas-
sage of the law.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows.
We present evidence in the next section on the
evolution of unionization before and after the RTW
law was enacted, followed by evidence on the growth
in manufacturing.
PATTERNS OF UNIONIZATION IN
IDAHO
Unionization Across Industries
We used data from the Census Bureau’s Current
Population Survey (CPS) to estimate unionization
rates. We describe the characteristics of the data
and methodology in the appendix. The employment
and establishments data for our analysis of manu-
facturing comes from the Census Bureau’s County
Business Patterns data set and is also described in
the appendix.
We start our analysis by examining the evolution
of the unionization rate in Idaho. We compare the
trends in Idaho’s unionization rate with the average
trend in both RTW states and NRTW states that had
an industrial mix similar to that of Idaho in the years
prior to the passage of the law, 1977-86. For this we
construct a measure of dispersion using the employ-
ment shares in broadly defined industries.8We identi-
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8 We computed the following measure of distance (∆ –
k) to Idaho for each
of the 50 states in terms of industrial mix and performed the compari-
son for the closest “neighbors”: 
,
where sit
k is the employment share in industry i in state k in year t, N
is the number of industries, T is the total number of years in the sample
period, and sit is the index for Idaho, defined similarly. We used employ-
ment data from the following industry classifications: agricultural, min-
ing, construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade,
retail trade, finance insurance and real estate services, and personal
services. The distribution of this measure had the following character-
istics: the maximum value was 0.143, the mean was 0.019, and the
5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles were 0.002, 0.005, 0.014,
0.024, and 0.035. We selected states with a distance of less than 0.005.
   










2 ()fied 11 such states: 5 RTW states (Kansas, Nebraska,
Utah, Virginia, and Iowa) and 6 NRTW states
(California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
and Washington).
So how do the patterns in unionization rates
differ across industries? The manufacturing sector,
being traditionally highly unionized, behaved quite
differently compared with the nonmanufacturing
sector. Figures 2 and 3, respectively, compare the
unionization rate in manufacturing to the average
of RTW and NRTW states. What is most interesting
about the trend for Idaho’s unionization is the rela-
tively large decline that occurred between 1981 and
1984, prior to the passage of the law, and the pro-
nounced recovery in the 1984-87 period, during
which much of the debate about the passage of the
law took place. We observe that the manufacturing
unionization rate in Idaho gradually converged to
the average unionization rate in RTW states. The
convergence took place mostly after 1987, and this
rate remained within the confidence bands and
below the average for RTW states that had similar
industrial composition prior to 1987. Figure 3 indi-
cates that the manufacturing unionization rate in
Idaho remained within the confidence bands for
the average for NRTW states for most of the sample
period, but fell below the lower confidence band in
1994 and remained away from the average thereafter.
The patterns observed in Idaho’s manufacturing
unionization rate do not seem to result from business
cycles that affected all other states uniformly. How-
ever, since Idaho is a small state, its manufacturing
unionization rate may have been subject to fluctua-
tions in the unionization rate of a small number of
industries, particularly in the period prior to the
passage of the RTW law. Examining Idaho’s unioniza-
tion rates in narrowly defined manufacturing indus-
tries, we discovered that fluctuations in the years
prior to 1987 were closely related to fluctuations in
the food manufacturing industry.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the overall
unionization rate in Idaho versus the average union-
ization rate in the five states with RTW laws and a
similar industrial mix.9 Idaho’s unionization rate
was around 17 percent in 1977; by 2000 it was down
to about 9 percent, a decline of almost 50 percent.
The average rate for RTW states also declined steadily,
starting in 1981. Throughout the period of analysis,
in 1983, 1984, and then again in 1987, 1989, 1991,
1992, and 1994, Idaho’s unionization rate was sig-
nificantly different from the average RTW state’s
unionization rate, at the 90 percent confidence level.
In the years 1977-81 we observe that Idaho’s union-
ization rate was close to the upper confidence band.
In just three years, during the period 1981-84, the
32 MAY/JUNE 2002
9 Note that there was no change in other states’ RTW law status during
1977-2000. Idaho was the only state that changed status during this
period. Louisiana became a RTW state in 1976 and is included with
the other RTW states throughout the period. Excluding Louisiana did
not change our conclusions.
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Figure 3unionization rate fell from about 22 percent to
almost 9 percent, a decline of about 60 percent. The
decline observed for the average rate for RTW states
was not as pronounced.10 The pattern between
1984 and 1987 also exhibits a partial recovery in
the unionization rate. After the law took effect in
1987, however, we observe a persistent decline in
the unionization rate.
In Figure 5, we compare Idaho with the six
closest NRTW states. First, note that on average, a
NRTW state had a unionization rate of about 24
percent in 1977, compared with 17 percent for RTW
states. These figures were about 14 percent and 9
percent, respectively, in 2000. The difference in
unionization rates between the two groups of states
persisted throughout the sample period. In the years
1979-82, Idaho’s unionization rate is not statistically
distinguishable from the average unionization rate
in NRTW states. In the years following the 1981-84
decline, however, we can reject the equality of the
two rates. Idaho’s unionization rate hit the lower
confidence bound for the NRTW states’ average
around 1982 and consistently remained below that
bound for the rest of the analysis period. From the
patterns observed in Figures 4 and 5, Idaho’s union-
ization rate very early diverged from the NRTW
states’ average unionization rate and approached
the RTW states’ average. As shown in Figures 6 and
7, this behavior was largely due to the behavior
observed in the nonmanufacturing sector. In both
figures, the dip during the 1981-84 period is visible
and highly pronounced, and even as early as 1982
the unionization rate in nonmanufacturing indus-
tries had converged to the average unionization
rate in RTW states and was statistically below the
NRTW states’ average. It is therefore likely that the
quick convergence in Idaho’s overall unionization
rate was unrelated to the passage of the RTW.11
Idaho’s Neighbors
To investigate the trends in the unionization
rate further, we concentrate on Idaho’s geographic
neighbors and run a simple state-by-state regression
of the form
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10 As explained in the appendix, prior to 1983, unionization rates were
calculated based on samples that are roughly one-third of the samples
that are used after 1983. The estimated unionization rates are less
precise for the period before 1983 due to sample variability, especially
for smaller states, and in particular for 1981, when the sample sizes
were roughly one-third of the samples in 1977-80. Estimates of overall
and nonmanufacturing unionization rates were less sensitive to sam-
pling problems than those for the manufacturing sector. Still, when we
discount 1981 and 1982, the decline observed in the manufacturing
unionization rate from 1980 to 1983 is reliably estimated.
11 As previously footnoted, the estimates of overall and nonmanufactur-
ing unionization rates during the period 1977-86 were not likely to
be seriously affected by the small sample sizes used by the CPS before
1983, even accounting for 1981, as the sample sizes used in the esti-
mation exceeded the thresholds described in the appendix for reliability
of the estimates. We are, however, silent on the driving factors of union-
ization in Idaho’s nonmanufacturing industries, as the focus of our
analysis is the manufacturing sector. We did verify, however, that the
1981-84 decline was not due to closures of large unionized firms.
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Change in Unionization Rate by State and Industry
Overall Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing
1977-86 1987-2000 F (Prob) 1977-86 1987-2000 F (Prob) 1977-85 1987-2000 F (Prob)
U.S. –3.7 –1.8 27.37*** –4.7 –3.3 15.54*** –2.8 –1.2 17.97***
[–0.3] [0.06] (0.00) [0.3] [0.06] (0.00) [0.3] [0.08] (0.00)
Idaho –6.4 –2.8 3.2* –5.8 –8.0 1.06 –6.3 –0.5 4.75**
[1.8] [0.7] (0.08) [2.0] [0.8] (0.31) [2.5] [0.7] (0.04)
Washington –3.0 –1.7 2.98* –4.1 –2.5 2.73 –2.4 –1.2 2.25
[0.7] [0.3] (0.09) [0.9] [0.3] (0.11) [0.7] [0.3] (0.14)
Oregon –3.6 –2.1 1.71 –7.6 –5.7 3.14* –1.6 –1.3 0.06
[1.0] [0.4] (0.20) [0.7] [0.7] (0.09) [1.1] [0.4] (0.81)
Montana –4.2 –2.1 6.48*** –3.0 –5.3 0.65 –4.4 –1.8 11.36***
[0.7] [0.4] (0.01) [2.7] [0.9] (0.43) [0.6] [0.3] (0.00)
Nevada (RTW) –3.1 0.2 10.34*** –9.2 –0.5 3.46* –2.9 0.2 10.22***
[0.9] [0.4] (0.00) [3.9] [2.5] (0.07) [0.8] [0.4] (0.00)
Utah (RTW) –5.5 –3.7 1.26 –9.6 –2.6 11.49*** –4.7 –4.0 0.17
[1.4] [0.6] (0.27) [1.7] [1.2] (0.00) [1.4] [0.7] (0.68)
Wyoming –3.5 –3.8 0.02 0.2 2.8 0.45 –3.7 –4.0 0.04
(RTW) [1.5] [0.2] (0.88) [2.1] [3.3] (0.51) [1.6] [0.2] (0.83)
NOTE: Heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in brackets. Figures in bold indicate significance at 1 percent.
``F” gives the F statistic for the test of equality of coefficients across two time periods. Probability values for the F statistic are in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** indicate significance of the F statistic at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 1
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Figure 7(1) logut=αPRE+βPRED(t–t0)+∆αPOST(1–D)
+βPOST(1–D)(t–t0)+εt,
where t0=1977, t=1977,...,2000, and D is a dummy
variable that takes on a value of 1 if t<1987 and 0
otherwise. In this projection, αPRE is the intercept
term for the pre-law period, βPRE is the pre-law slope
coefficient, ∆αPOST is the post-law increment in the
intercept, and βPOST is the post-law slope coefficient.
The estimated values of βPRE and βPOST are multiplied
by 100 and are presented in Table 1. With the log
specification, the figures in the table can be inter-
preted as the annual percent rate of change in
unionization. We also present the test results for the
equality of the growth rates across the two periods
βPRE=βPOST.
We observe a persistent decline in unionization
rates. When all industries are considered, columns
1 and 2 reveal that, in general, the magnitude of
the decline was higher in the 1977-86 period in all
states in the region and in the United States, except
for Wyoming. In Idaho, the rate of decline in overall
unionization slowed down from 6.4 percent in the
pre-law period to 2.8 percent in the post-law period.
The difference between these two rates, however, is
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level.
Note also that, in both periods, Idaho’s rates of
decline were higher than the U.S. rates and most of
those for its neighboring states.
When manufacturing is considered separately,
columns 4 and 5 provide a different view. In fact,
the decline in Idaho’s manufacturing unionization
rate accelerated somewhat in the post-law period,
surpassing both the U.S. and its neighboring states,
which, for the most part, exhibited a slowdown in
the rate of decline. The difference between Idaho’s
unionization rates in manufacturing pre-law and
post-law is not statistically significant because of
the relatively high standard deviation for the pre-law
period. Overall, the slowdown in the rate of decline
of unionization did not apply to Idaho’s manufactur-
ing and was primarily driven by nonmanufacturing
industries, as can be seen in the last two columns.
The findings in this section suggest that Idaho’s
unionization rate declined substantially over the
sample period, approaching the average unioniza-
tion rate in RTW states. While the decline in the
unionization rate, especially in manufacturing, is
persistent after 1987, a substantial part of the decline
appears to have happened before 1987. The pattern
between 1984 and 1987, during which much of
the debate about the passage of the law took place,
exhibits a partial recovery in the unionization rate.
After the law took effect in 1987, we observe a con-
tinuing decline in the unionization rate, especially
in manufacturing. Particularly during the period
prior to 1987, large fluctuations in Idaho’s unioniza-
tion rate in manufacturing seem to be related to
the behavior of individual industries.
MANUFACTURING
We now turn to the industrial organization con-
sequences of declining unionization in Idaho. We
focus on two main indicators. First, we look at the
growth in employment and the number of establish-
ments in manufacturing industries and compare
Idaho with its neighbors, in both the pre- and post-
law periods. If the passage of the law has had an
important positive effect on manufacturing growth,
then we expect to observe an acceleration in the
growth rate of employment and the number of
establishments in Idaho. Second, we look at the
changes in the importance of large establishments
in manufacturing in Idaho, again, for both periods.
As Holmes (1998) argues, large manufacturing
establishments are more likely to be attracted to
RTW states because larger plants are more likely to
be unionized. This argument suggests that we might
expect an influx of new large establishments into
Idaho or an expansion of existing establishments.
Employment Growth
Figure 8 is a preliminary look at the evolution
of the three key variables in Idaho’s manufacturing,
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Figure 8where we have normalized each variable by its 1987
value. Before 1987, there is considerable fluctuation
in both employment and the number of establish-
ments, with no visible growth trend. Unionization
exhibits a decline, but is also subject to wide fluctu-
ations, as discussed before. The pattern after 1987
is remarkably stable for all three series. Employment
and the number of establishments grew steadily in
that period by about 40 percent compared with their
1987 level, and unionization declined by more than
60 percent.
Table 2 shows the simple average annual growth
rates in employment, number of establishments,
and average establishment size in manufacturing
for Idaho and its neighbors. Consider employment
and the number of establishments first. From 1975
to 1986, Idaho’s manufacturing employment grew
at a rate of 0.76 percent annually on average. The
average growth rate in the number of establishments
was around 1.27 percent per year. However, there
is a large standard deviation associated with both
of these figures, a reflection of the fluctuating
manufacturing growth in the state in that period,
as depicted in Figure 8. Idaho’s NRTW neighbors
did not fare much better. Washington and Oregon
appear to have experienced higher growth rates, but
the standard deviations are so high that the differ-
ences with respect to Idaho are not statistically sig-
nificant. Idaho’s RTW neighbors appear to have
fared much better in this period, except for Wyoming.
Overall, it seems that the period before the law was
a period of weak growth, especially for NRTW states.
This pattern changes dramatically in the post-
law period. Idaho’s growth rates were much higher
compared with those in the pre-law period. Further-
more, the difference between the two periods’ growth
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Manufacturing Growth Rates in Idaho and Its Neighbors (Simple Time Averages, Percent
Annual Growth)
Employment No. of establishments Average establishment size
1975-86 1987-96 1975-86 1987-96 1975-86 1987-96
Idaho 0.76 3.71 1.27 3.99 –0.39 –0.21
[6.38] [2.56] [4.20] [3.16] [6.73] [3.17]
(1.36*) (1.98**) (0.08)
Washington 1.57 2.18 2.86 1.96 –1.04 0.29
[5.34] [6.23] [4.16] [2.44] [7.48] [6.94]
(0.25) (–0.59) (0.43)
Oregon 1.18 1.67 2.32 1.19 –0.98 0.55
[6.86] [2.64] [4.23] [2.52] [7.54] [4.30]
(0.21) (–0.74) (0.57)
Montana –0.33 1.35 1.94 2.09 –2.10 –0.51
[6.80] [3.47] [5.43] [4.34] [6.79] [6.33]
(0.71) (0.07) (0.56)
Nevada (RTW) 6.15 4.84 5.46 6.01 0.96 –1.00
[9.22] [5.02] [6.52] [3.43] [10.42] [5.64]
(–0.40) (0.24) (–0.53)
Utah (RTW) 3.51 3.26 3.01 3.57 0.58 –0.17
[4.52] [2.64] [2.93] [3.55] [5.69] [4.96]
(–0.15) (0.41) (–0.32)
Wyoming (RTW) –1.42 3.32 2.19 2.69 –0.53 0.87
[9.66] [3.39] [6.50] [4.16] [9.63] [7.26]
(0.59) (0.21) (0.38)
NOTE: Standard deviations in brackets. Figures in parentheses are the t statistics associated with the difference of the variable’s average
across two periods of analysis. * and ** indicate significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a one-sided test; t statistics
are based on unpaired comparisons with unequal variances.
Table 2rates turns out to be statistically significant, unlike
the case with neighboring states. Idaho’s post-law
growth rates also exceeded those of its NRTW neigh-
bors and were similar to those of its RTW neighbors
(although the pairwise comparisons are not always
statistically significant due to large standard errors).
Overall, the patterns of change in the growth of
employment and the number of establishments
point to a post-law acceleration of growth in Idaho,
but not in any of the neighboring states.
Table 3 shows the results of a regression analo-
gous to equation (1). The dependent variable is
either the logarithm of employment or the number
of establishments in manufacturing. The most not-
able result from this table is the exceptionally large
growth rate of Idaho in the post-law period for both
variables. The annual employment growth rate was
about 3.7 percent post-law, compared with an almost
zero annual average growth pre-law. The growth rate
in the number of establishments was about seven
times larger compared with that in the pre-law
period. Idaho did much better after the RTW law was
passed, compared with most other states in the
region, both in employment and the number of estab-
lishments. The differences in these growth rates
across the two periods have high statistical signifi-
cance for Idaho, but not for most of the other
states.
Manufacturing Employment Share
Before turning to the analysis of establishment
size, we report how the share of manufacturing as
a fraction of total private employment evolved in
Idaho. Again we compare Idaho against other states
that had a similar industrial mix in the period prior
to 1987. This analysis indicates that Idaho experi-
enced a substantial change in industrial mix, espe-
cially after the passage of the RTW law.12 Figure 9
compares Idaho’s manufacturing share with the
average manufacturing share in the six NRTW states
we identified earlier. First, note that manufacturing’s
average employment share in NRTW states declined
throughout the sample period, which is an indica-
tion of the steady decline in the manufacturing
sector in the United States, especially during the
last quarter of the twentieth century. Idaho’s manu-
facturing share was far below the NRTW average
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observed that Idaho also experienced a substantial change during
our sample period in the composition of its manufacturing industry.
For brevity, we omit this analysis.
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Manufacturing Growth Rates: Results from State-by-State Regressions
Employment No. of establishments
1977-86 1987-2000 F (Prob) 1977-85 1987-2000 F (Prob)
Idaho –0.03 3.7 58.97 0.6 4.1 82.71
[0.4] [0.2] (0.00) [0.3] [0.2] (0.00)
Washington 1.1 0.4 0.48 2.4 2.1 0.93
[0.5] [0.8] (0.49) [0.2] [0.2] (0.34)
Oregon 0.02 1.2 3.17 2.0 1.6 2.04
[0.6] [0.2] (0.09) [0.2] [0.2] (0.17)
Montana –1.3 1.2 15.74 1.8 2.6 2.58
[0.6] [0.1] (0.00) [0.6] [0.2] (0.12)
Nevada (RTW) 5.0 4.3 0.49 4.9 6.1 4.39
[0.7] [0.6] (0.49) [0.5] [0.2] (0.05)
Utah (RTW) 3.3 3.1 0.28 2.9 4.0 8.85
[0.3] [0.1] (0.60) [0.2] [0.3] (0.00)
Wyoming (RTW) –0.03 2.7 3.99 2.1 3.0 2.07
[1.3] [0.2] (0.06) [0.4] [0.3] (0.16)
NOTE: Heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in brackets. Figures in bold indicate significance at 1 percent.
``F” gives the F statistic for the test of equality of coefficients across two time periods. Probability values for the F statistic are in
parentheses.
Table 3during the 1975-82 period and declined at a much
faster rate than the average share in NRTW states.
This trend slowly started to change around 1982;
from 1984 onward, the manufacturing share in
Idaho was above the NRTW average and declined
much more slowly, which is consistent with accel-
erated growth in Idaho’s manufacturing employment
in this period. By 1987, Idaho’s share exceeded the
NRTW average, and the difference gradually became
statistically significant. By the end of the analysis
period, we can reject the hypothesis that Idaho had
a manufacturing share similar to an “average” NRTW
state with, initially, a similar industrial composition.
The comparison with the RTW states’ average share
in Figure 10 is consistent with this finding. While
Idaho’s share was much lower than the average RTW
states’ share before 1982, it gradually became closer
to the average afterward.13
Average Establishment Size
Considering the results in Table 2 regarding the
change in average establishment size, defined by
the number of employees per establishment, we
do not observe any definitive pattern. In all states,
the difference in the average growth rates in this
variable across the two periods was insignificant.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that Idaho
did not become an attractive location for larger
plants or that existing plants had less incentive to
expand. It is well-known that there has been an
ongoing nationwide trend toward smaller establish-
ments.14 It is possible that the increasing fraction
of small plants in Idaho masked the increasing
importance of larger establishments. To investigate
this possibility, we look at the evolution of two
measures: (i) the fraction of manufacturing employ-
ment in large establishments and (ii) the average
size of large establishments. Following Holmes
(1998), we define an establishment as “large” if it
has at least 100 employees.15 If large establishments
became more important in Idaho’s manufacturing
sector after the law, then the first measure is expected
to be higher in the post-law period. Similarly, if
existing large establishments expanded, or if new
large establishments that chose Idaho as a location
after the law were larger than their pre-law counter-
parts on average, then we should see an increase in
the second measure, too.
As Table 4 clearly indicates, the two variables
38 MAY/JUNE 2002
13 The observations in this section also apply if we consider all RTW
and NRTW states, not just those with an industrial mix similar to that
of Idaho.
14 See, for example, Davis (1990) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). The
trend toward smaller establishment sizes might also be responsible
for declining unionization, as explored by Even and Macpherson
(1990).
15 This choice is somewhat ad hoc, but as reported by Holmes (1998),
70 percent of all manufacturing establishments in 1992 were classified
in this category. Outside manufacturing, the figure was 38 percent.
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Figure 10measuring the importance of large establishments
in the manufacturing sector experienced a signifi-
cant increase in Idaho after the law was passed,
but this did not occur in any of the neighboring
states. There was about a 3 percent increase in the
average fraction of employment in large establish-
ments after the law, and the average establishment
size for large establishments grew by about 24
employees, or by 7 percent. These results are con-
sistent with the view (i) that Idaho became an attrac-
tive location for large establishments after the RTW
law was passed and (ii) that the importance of large
establishments in the manufacturing sector increased.
CONCLUSION
We have examined the impact of RTW laws on
a state’s industrial performance using Idaho’s recent
experience. We have presented evidence that, even
as a late adopter of the law, Idaho experienced a
strong decline in unionization and an acceleration
in manufacturing growth. Evidence from Idaho’s
neighbors suggests that a similar pattern was not
experienced by other states in the region, which
indicates that a regional boom is not a likely expla-
nation. We are cautious, however, in associating the
increase in manufacturing growth with the passage
of the law. The exact starting time of the decline in
unionization and the narrow time frame of fluctua-
tions in the unionization rate before the passage of
the law suggest that the relation is not clear cut. The
initial decline in unionization and its subsequent
rebounding between 1984 and 1987 can potentially
be related also to evolving expectations about the
eventual ruling on the RTW law—because the
bureaucratic process and political battles for the
passing of the RTW law took almost two years, with
several developments in favor of and against union-
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Large Establishments in Manufacturing: Idaho and Its Neighbors
Average fraction of employment Average establishment size
in large establishments in large establishments
1975-86 1987-96 1975-86 1987-96
Idaho 0.66 0.68 324.6 348.2
[0.015] [0.007] [16.3] [10.8]
(2.97) (4.03)
Washington 0.70 0.69 444.1 451.6
[0.013] [0.018] [25.3] [42.1]
(–1.06) (0.49)
Oregon 0.63 0.61 157.9 148.4
[0.016] [0.007] [7.5] [3.7]
(–3.69) (–3.84)
Montana 0.51 0.43 261.6 224.8
[0.035] [0.028] [22.6] [11.1]
(–5.84) (–4.96)
Nevada (RTW) 0.51 0.47 236.5 236.6
[0.020] [0.035] [21.4] [16.3]
(–2.84) (0.01)
Utah (RTW) 0.68 0.68 355.3 358.3
[0.015] [0.011] [30.0] [11.0]
(0.01) (0.32)
Wyoming (RTW) 0.43 0.42 198.9 184.3
[0.035] [0.020] [16.6] [8.9]
(–0.31) (–2.48)
NOTE: Standard deviations in brackets. Figures in parentheses are the t statistics associated with the test for the equality of the variable’s
average across two periods of analysis. Figures in bold indicate significance at 1 percent; t tests are based on unpaired comparisons
wth unequal variances.
Table 4ism. Adding to our skepticism is the Bunker Hill
incidence mentioned earlier, which, by itself, may
have been a turning point for the attitudes toward
unions in Idaho. In summary, while we are tempted
to associate the growth patterns and the decline in
unionization with the passage of the law, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the RTW law was a result
of growing anti-unionism in Idaho and may not have
been the cause of growth, per se.
In terms of policy implications, one has to be
cautioned before prematurely claiming that Idaho’s
exceptional growth pattern would apply to every
state considering the adoption of the law. Idaho’s
experience would definitely be more valuable than
the evidence from other RTW legislation in the past
because it took place in an environment where
unionization had already lost considerable ground.
As the analysis presented here suggests, even the
process leading to the passage of the law may be
quite important for the timing of events and the
patterns of growth in key variables. Examining the
behavior of union organizing activity through cer-
tification elections, as well as analyzing the effects
on wages, can provide a more detailed analysis of
the impact of the RTW law on unionization. The
recent experience of Oklahoma, together with
Idaho’s, can be used for this purpose. The ongoing
work by Dinlersoz and Hernández-Murillo (2001)
aims to provide more evidence in this direction.
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Unionization Rates
Estimates of union membership rates by state
and by state industry were obtained using the May
files of the Census Bureau’s Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the period 1977-81, and from the
Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups CPS files for the
period 1983-2000, following the methodology of
Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001). The 1982
CPS did not include any questions pertaining to
unions, and we set our estimate for 1982 to the
average of the estimates in 1981 and 1983. For
1983 and onward, each year included all 12 months
of the CPS, with each month including the outgoing
rotation groups that were asked the union ques-
tions. Prior to 1981, the May surveys administered
the union questions to all rotation groups; there-
fore the estimates before 1981 are based on sam-
ples that are one third of the size of the samples
used after 1983. The May 1981 CPS administered
the union questions only to the outgoing rotation
groups, making sample sizes roughly one-third of
the samples used in 1977-80. Union estimates for
1981 are, therefore, the least reliable.16
Due to the varying sample sizes, much of the
year-to-year variation in the estimated unionization
rates before 1983 can be attributed to sampling
error. This would be a more serious problem if
one wished to reliably estimate union earnings,
for example, as opposed to simply estimate union
membership rates as we did. The sample sizes of
major industry groups in Idaho (overall, manufac-
turing, and nonmanufacturing) were within the
standard measures used in the literature and the
Census Bureau’s guidelines (larger than 100 employ-
ees), except for manufacturing and particularly in
1981.
We were able to verify that our estimates of the
proportion of union members from the employed
population closely matched those of Hirsch,
Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) at the national
and state levels. Our estimates of state-industry
rates use the same methodology, but there were
no available series to verify accuracy.
Data on Industries
The data on industries come from the Census
Bureau’s County Business Patterns data series for
the years 1975-96. The data covers all taxpaying
establishments with one or more paid employees.
The employment figures are taken from the mid-
March period of every year. An establishment is
defined as a single location where business is con-
ducted or where services or industrial operations
are performed. Establishment size designations are
measured by paid employment in the mid-March
pay period. Establishment counts for 1983 and
onward are based on a determination of active
status as of anytime during the year. For the years
prior to 1983, establishment counts are based on
whether the establishment was active in the fourth
quarter. The data is available at the national, state,
and county levels. Further details on this data set
can be obtained from the Census Bureau’s Web
site, <www.census.gov>.
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Appendix
16 Every household that enters the CPS is interviewed each month for
4 months, then ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4
more months. The union questions are asked only to households
in their fourth and eighth interview. These are the outgoing rotation
groups.42 MAY/JUNE 2002
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